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ABSTRACT
Advanced Persistent reat (APT) is one of the most serious types
of cyber aacks, which is a new and more complex version of multi-
step aack. Within the APT life cycle, continuous communication
between infected hosts and Command and Control (C&C) servers
is maintained to instruct and guide the compromised machines.
ese communications are usually protected by Secure Sockets
Layer (SSL) encryption, making it dicult to identify if the trac
directed to sites is malicious. is paper presents a Malicious SSL
certicate Detection (MSSLD) module, which aims at detecting the
APT C&C communications based on a blacklist of malicious SSL
certicates. is blacklist consists of two forms of SSL certicates,
the SHA1 ngerprints and the serial & subject, that are associated
with malware and malicious activities. In this detection module, the
network trac is processed and all secure connections are ltered.
e SSL certicate of each secure connection is then matched with
the SSL certicate blacklist. is module was experimentally eval-
uated and the results show successful detection of malicious SSL
certicates.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Security and privacy → Intrusion detection systems; Net-
work security; •Networks→ Network monitoring;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Cyber aacks refer to intentional activities against soware, hard-
ware or data in computer networks or systems. ese activities may
degrade, disrupt, destroy, or deny access to legitimate users. Many
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intelligence agencies and governments’ militaries are actively get-
ting ready to launch or block cyber aacks, maybe in conjunction
with traditional aacks or counter-aacks. Cyber exploitation is
another expression, which refers to intelligence-gathering rather
than devastating actions [17]. e goal is to get information and
data without geing caught or being detected. As the number of
ubiquitous devices grow [1, 2, 33–35, 42, 47, 50], the number of the
security threats with implication for the general public increases.
Unfortunately, new technologies, such as the Internet of ings,
comes with new set of security threat that needs to be addressed.
Over the last decade, malware and botnets [28, 31] have in-
creased to become a key reason of the majority of the (Distributed)
Denial-of-Service (DOS) activities [38], direct aacks [4], spear
phishing [22] and scanning [51], which takes place through the
Internet. Botnets are networks formed by ”enslaving” host comput-
ers, called bots (derived from the word robot), that are controlled
by one or more aackers, called botmasters, with the intention
of performing malicious activities [5]. In other words, bots are
malicious codes running on host computers that allow botmasters
to control the host computers remotely and make them perform
various actions [15]. It has been noticed that there is a change in
motivation, from curiosity and fame seeking/excitement-seeking
to illegal nancial gain, this has been marked by a rising sophisti-
cation in the evolution of malicious soware [16]. Moreover, the
availability of easy-to-use tool kits to build malware will probably
keep malware a threat to consumers, businesses and governments
in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, network monitoring ap-
proaches [52] have become more and more important in modern
complicated networks.
One of the most serious types of cyber aacks is the Advanced
Persistent reat (APT) [20], which is targeting a specic organisa-
tion and it is performed through several steps. e main aim of APT
is espionage and then data exltration. erefore, APT is consid-
ered as a new and more complex version of multi-step aack [36].
ese APTs form a problem for current detection methods [19] as
they use advanced techniques like social engineering [27] and make
use of unknown vulnerabilities. Moreover, the economic damages
due to a successful APT aack can be very expensive. e expected
cost of aacks is the major motivation for the investments in intru-
sion detection and prevention systems [46]. APTs are currently one
of the most serious threats to the companies and governments [54].
A novel approach for APT detection is proposed in [26]. e
suggested system undergoes two main phases, the rst one detects
eight techniques commonly used in APT life cycle. For that purpose,
eight detection modules are presented, which are disguised exe le
detection [18], malicious le hash detection [25], malicious domain
name detection [24], malicious IP address detection [23], malicious
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SSL certicate detection, domain ux detection [21], scan detection,
and Tor connection detection [30]. e second phase includes a
correlation framework to link the outputs of the detection modules.
Within the APT life cycle, continuous communication between
the infected hosts and the C&C servers should be preserved to
instruct and guide the compromised machines. ese communica-
tions are usually protected by Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryp-
tion, making it dicult to identify if the trac directed to sites
is malicious. is paper presents the malicious SSL certicate de-
tection (MSSLD) module, which aims at detecting the APT C&C
communications based on a blacklist of malicious SSL certicates.
is blacklist consists of two forms of SSL certicates, the SHA1
ngerprints and the serial & subject, that are associated with mal-
ware and malicious activities. In this detection module, the network
trac is processed and all secure connections are ltered. e SSL
certicate of each secure connection is then matched with the SSL
certicate blacklist.
e remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the related work to APT detection. e malicious SSL
certicate detection module and its algorithms are explained in
Section 3. Section 4 shows the evaluation results and Section 5
concludes the paper.
2 RELATEDWORK
A classication model for APT detection is presented in [14]. is
model is built based on machine learning algorithms. First, the
legitimate trac for normal users is analysed aiming to extract the
CPU usage, memory usage, open ports and number of les in the
system32 folder. A piece of malware, which is previously used for
the APT aack, is injected into the network and the four features
are extracted. e dataset of benign and malicious features are
used to train the detection model using dierent machine learning
algorithms.
TerminAPTor, an APT detector, is described in [12]. is de-
tector uses information ow tracking to nd the links between
the elementary aacks, which are triggered within the APT life
cycle. TerminAPTor depends on an agent, which can be a standard
intrusion detection system, to detect those elementary aacks. A
statistical APT detector, similar to TerminAPTor detector, is de-
veloped in [48]. is system considers that APT undergoes ve
states which are delivery, exploit, installation, C&C and actions;
and several activities are taken in each state. e generated events
in each state are correlated in a statistical manner.
An APT detection system based on C&C domains detection is in-
troduced in [53]. is work analyses the C&C communication based
on the observation that the access to C&C domains is independent,
while the access to legal domains is correlated.
An approach for APT detection based on spear phishing detec-
tion is explored in [13]. is approach depends on mathematical
and computational analysis to lter spam emails. Tokens, which are
considered as a group of words and characters such as (click here,
free, Viagra, replica), should be dened for the detection algorithm
to separate legitimate and spam emails.
An active-learning-based framework for malicious PDFs detec-
tion is suggested in [40]. ese malicious PDFs can be used in the
early steps of APT to get the point of entry.
An approach based on Data Leakage Prevention (DLP) is pro-
posed in [49]. is approach focuses on detecting the last step of
APT which is the data exltration. A DLP algorithm is used to pro-
cess the data trac to detect data leaks and generate ”ngerprints”
according to the features of the leak.
A context-based framework for APT detection is explained
in [32]. is framework is based on modelling APT as an aack
pyramid in which the top of the pyramid represents the aack goal,
and the lateral planes indicates the environments involved in the
APT life cycle.
An in-depth analysis of Duqu is presented in [7]. A European
organisation was targeted by aackers using the Duqu malware to
steal data. e authors propose the Duqu detector toolkit, which
consists of six investigation tools developed to detect the Duqu
malware involved in the APT aacks.
With regards to the processing of multiple streams of events,
IBM suggests a conceptual model for event processing in [39]. It
describes the basic requirements to design an ecient correlation
system. e work presented in [10] is based on nite state machines
and uses a query language for event processing. Both systems can
process the events in real time, a key limitation shared by both
approaches is that they can not detect so called low & slow aacks,
which take place over an extended time period.
Finally, APT detection systems face serious shortcomings in
achieving real time detection [6], detecting all APT aack steps [6],
balance between false positive and false negative rates [7], and
correlating of events spanning over a long period of time [10, 39].
To address those weaknesses, a new approach for APT detection has
been presented in [26], and this paper is a step towards developing
the proposed system.
3 MALICIOUS SSL CERTIFICATE
DETECTION (MSSLD)
APT C&C communications are usually protected by Secure Sockets
Layer (SSL) encryption, which makes it dicult to identify mali-
cious trac. MSSLD aims at detecting C&C communications based
on a blacklist of malicious SSL certicates [3, 37]. is blacklist con-
sists of two forms of SSL certicates, the SHA1 ngerprints and the
serial & subject, which are associated with malware and malicious
activities. As shown in Figure 1, the network trac is processed
and all secure connections are ltered. e SSL certicate of each
secure connection is then matched with the SSL certicate blacklist.
e MSSLD module is implemented on top of the Bro [29, 43]
passive, open-source network trac analyser. It is primarily a
security monitor, which inspects all trac on a link in depth for
signs of suspicious activity. e most immediate benet gained
from deploying Bro is an extensive set of log les, which record a
network’s activity in high-level terms. ese logs include not only
a comprehensive record of every connection seen on the wire, but
also application-layer transcripts such as, e.g., all HTTP sessions
with their requested URIs, key headers, MIME types, and server
responses; DNS requests with replies; and much more. Bro event
engine reduces the incoming packet stream into a series of higher-
level events, more than 300 events. ese events reect network
activity in policy-neutral terms, i.e., they describe what has been
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Figure 1: Methodology of themalicious SSL certicate detec-
tion.
seen, but not why, or whether it is signicant. e MSSLD mod-
ule consumes and handles some of Bro events, explained later in
Section 3.1; all connection information (such as timestamp, src ip,
src port, dest ip, dest port) can be extracted from those events.
is detection module runs through two algorithms, mentioned
further in Section 3.1, the rst one is intelligence-based MSSLD
and the second algorithm is event-based MSSLD. e intelligence-
based MSSLD makes use of the Bro Intelligence Framework [11].
is framework enables aack detection modules to consume data
from dierent data sources and make it available for matching.
MSSLD is a blacklist-based detection module in which the ma-
licious SSL certicates blacklists are automatically updated based
on dierent intelligence feeds at once. e automatic update runs
parallel with the module process and there is no need to stop or
restart MSSLD. is parallel-running feature allows a continuous
live monitoring of the network trac and supports real time de-
tection. Based on the MSSLD algorithm, two automatic update
mechanisms have been applied. Figure 2 shows the automatic
update of the blacklists used by intelligence-based MSSLD. e
user crontab le is congured to run blacklist update.sh each day
at 3:00 am, this shell script connects through the Internet to the
data source servers and downloads updated blacklists of malicious
SSL certicate hashes into a new blacklist.intel text le. is text
le is connected to the Intelligence Framework, which consumes it
as described in Section 3.1.
used by
intelligence-based MSSLDIntelligence
feeds
crontab file
blacklist_update.sh
blacklist.intel Intelligence Framework
Figure 2: Automatic update of the blacklist used by
intelligence-based MSSLD.
Figure 3 shows the automatic update of the blacklists used by
the event-based MSSLD. e updated blacklist is downloaded into
ssl blacklist.txt text le. e Input Framework [44], built in Bro,
enables MSSLD to use that text le as an input. e Input Frame-
work reads ssl blacklist.txt le into bad ssl group, which is used by
event-based MSSLD.
Intelligence
feeds
crontab file
blacklist_update.sh
ssl_blacklist.txt Input Framework bad_ssl
used by
event-based MSSLD
Figure 3: Automatic update of the blacklist used by event-
based MSSLD.
As an output of the MSSLD module, in case of a malicious SSL
certicate is detected, a corresponding event (ssl alert) is generated.
is event is to be used for alert correlation [8]. Additionally, an
alert email is sent to the Request Tracker (RT) [9], where the net-
work security team can perform additional forensics and respond
to the triggered alert. It is assumed that the network security team
responds to the generated alert within 24 hours, therefore, MSSLD
suppresses all the same alerts, the same alert is the one which has
the same infected host and the same malicious SSL certicate, into
one alert per day, so no repeated alert emails sent the network
security team. Moreover, this alert suppression reduces the compu-
tational cost of the alert correlation framework. To this end, aer an
alert is generated, this module adds the triggered alert into a specic
table, the t suppress ssl alert, where it stays for one day to ensure
that the module does not generate the same alert within the next
24 hours. When a malicious SSL certicate is detected, and before
an alert is generated, MSSLD checks the t suppress ssl alert table
in order to conclude if the same alert has been generated during
the previous day, if so, the alert is ignored. Along with generat-
ing a new alert, information regarding the alert and the malicious
connection (alert type, timestamp, src ip, src port, dest ip, dest port,
infected host, malicious ssl) is wrien into a specic log, i.e., black-
list detection ssl.log, to keep a historical record of the monitored
network.
3.1 MSSLD Algorithms
As the blacklist consists of two forms of malicious SSL certicates
(SHA1 ngerprints and serial & subject), two methods are followed
for malicious SSL certicate detection. e rst one is intelligence-
based MSSLD, shown in Algorithm 1, and the second method is
event-based MSSLD, shown in Algorithm 2.
In the intelligence-based MSSLD, the Bro Intelligence Frame-
work is used and congured to monitor all secure connections
SSL certicates’ hashes. is framework is connected to the black-
list.intel le, which contains the SSL certicate blacklist. Aer
extracting all secure connections trac, SSL certicates hashes
are passed to the intelligence framework to be checked against
the intelligence data set blacklist.intel. When a match with any
indicator type of the intelligence data is found, the intelligence
framework generates an Intel::match event. rough this event,
if the indicator type is CERT HASH, it means this connection has
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Algorithm 1 Implementation pseudo-code of intelligence-based
MSSLD
1: Get malicious SSL certicates hashes blacklist (blacklist.intel)
2: Filter secure connections trac
3: Extract SSL certicate hash
4: Send SSL certicate hash to Bro Intelligence Framework
5: if SSL certicate hash is in blacklist.intel then
6: if the connection source IP belongs to the monitored net-
work then
7: if the same ssl alert had not been generated over the
last day then
8: Generate an event (ssl alert)
9: Write ssl alert into blacklist detection ssl.log
10: Send an alert email to RT
11: Suppress the same ssl alert over the next day
12: end if
13: else if the connection destination IP belongs to the moni-
tored network then
14: if the same ssl alert had not been generated over the
last day then
15: Generate an event (ssl alert)
16: Write ssl alert into blacklist detection ssl.log
17: Send an alert email to RT
18: Suppress the same ssl alert over the next day
19: end if
20: else
21: goto End
22: end if
23: else
24: goto End
25: end if
26: End
a malicious SSL certicate. Next, both connection sides, source
and destination IP addresses, are checked through the is local addr
function to check if the connection is established to or from the
monitored network. To avoid raising the same alert within the
same day, the t1 suppress ssl alert table is checked to ensure that it
does not contain the same detected [host IP address, SSL certicate
hash] set.
MSSLD then generates ssl alert event, writes the malicious con-
nection information into a specic log blacklist detection ssl.log,
sends an alert email regarding the malicious SSL certicate de-
tection to RT and adds the current detected set [host IP address,
SSL certicate hash] into t1 suppress ssl alert table. e wrien
information into blacklist detection ssl.log is:
timestamp = s$conn$start_time
alert_type = "ssl_alert"
connection = s$conn$id
infected_host = s$conn$id$orig_h
malicious_ssl = s\$indicator
In the event-based MSSLD, the network trac is processed and
ltered into secure connections trac, and then x509 certicate
event can be generated for encountered X509 certicates [45].
rough this event, the serial and subject of the X509 certicate
are checked for the certicate presence in the bad ssl group. is
Algorithm 2 Implementation pseudo-code of event-based MSSLD
1: Get malicious SSL certicates [serials and subjects] (bad ssl
group)
2: Filter secure connections trac
3: Get x509 certicate event
4: Extract SSL certicate [serial and subject]
5: if SSL certicate [serial and subject] is in bad ssl then
6: if the connection source IP belongs to the monitored net-
work then
7: if the same ssl alert had not been generated over the
last day then
8: Generate an event (ssl alert)
9: Write ssl alert into blacklist detection ssl.log
10: Send an alert email to RT
11: Suppress the same ssl alert over the next day
12: end if
13: else if the connection destination IP belongs to the moni-
tored network then
14: if the same ssl alert had not been generated over the
last day then
15: Generate an event (ssl alert)
16: Write ssl alert into blacklist detection ssl.log
17: Send an alert email to RT
18: Suppress the same ssl alert over the next day
19: end if
20: else
21: goto End
22: end if
23: else
24: goto End
25: end if
26: End
group contains many of serials and subjects of malicious X509 cer-
ticates. If a match is found, the module should determine if the
connection is established to or from one of the monitored network
hosts; accordingly, both the source and destination IP addresses
are checked through is local addr function. Before an ssl alert is
raised, the t2 suppress ssl alert table is to be checked to ensure that
the same alert was not raised previously during the same day.
As in the previous intelligence-based method, MSSLD generates
an ssl alert event, writes the malicious connection information into
a specic log, i.e., the blacklist detection ssl.log, sends an alert email
regarding the malicious SSL certicate detection to RT and adds
the current detected set [host IP address, SSL certicate hash] into
t2 suppress ssl alert table.
4 EVALUATION RESULTS
To evaluate the MSSLD module, a virtual Internet-connected net-
work was built, malware samples were injected into the virtual
network, the network trac was recorded into pcap les, and then
the MSSLD module was applied on those pcap les.
As illustrated in Figure 4, two Windows virtual machines were
connected to a physical consumer-grade router, which provided
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connection to the Internet. e virtual machines behaved as physi-
cal computers in a home network and were able to communicate
with each other. e Virtual machines trac was recorded into
two separate pcap les using the nictrace VirtualBox functional-
ity [41]. Because no soware besides the operating system and the
malware was installed on the virtual machines and the operating
system updates were disabled, the majority of the captured trac
was initiated by the installed malware. Moreover, it becomes easy
to establish the ground truth.
Internet
Home router
PCAP
PCAP
Clean PC
Infected PC
Figure 4: Topology of the implemented virtual network.
Two malware samples were injected independently into the
virtual network for 5 minutes each. e rst one is the Tro-
jan.Win32.Inject.sbqz, also known as TorrentLocker, which has MD5
hash value of aabe2844ee61e1f2969d7a96e1355a99. e second in-
jected malware sample is the Trojan.Win32.Staser.bazr malware,
which has MD5 hash value of e161a4d2716eb83552d3bd22ce5d603c.
e C&C servers for these two malware uses SSL certicates for
communication over hps. When the MSSLD module was applied
on the captured pcap les, it successfully detected the malicious
trac as shown in Figure 5.
#fields44timestamp44alert_type44infected_host44malicious_ssl
#types44time444444444444string444444444addr4444444444444444string
138.85770944ssl_alert44192.168.1.1014445c0c2f1fa15b0ac5ce5fc018992a6ecf7e1e6bc
143.72564744ssl_alert44192.168.1.1014448a79b6bc3b9616f1e62fa4014997087673b358f
207.14715244ssl_alert44192.168.1.10244d8af2f6a1a2ba2b1b6e1a260e791fcab88cc2c8d
#close442015-03-26-18-50-32
Figure 5: Part of a log produced by the MSSLD module.
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
is paper presents the malicious SSL certicate detection (MSSLD)
module, which aims at detecting the APT C&C communications
based on a blacklist of malicious SSL certicates. is blacklist
consists of two forms of SSL certicates, the SHA1 ngerprints and
the serial & subject, that are associated with malware and malicious
activities. is module, processes the network trac and lters all
secure connections. e SSL certicate of each secure connection
is then matched with the SSL certicate blacklist.
For future work, the output of this module will be correlated
with the outputs of other detection modules, developed to detect
commonly used techniques over the APT life cycle, to raise an alert
on APT detection.
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